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PREVIouS oPERATIon oF AnD 
PRoBLEmS CAuSED By THE FInAnCIAL 
SETTLEmEnT oF mATuRInG 
GoVERnmEnT SECuRITIES
in Hungary, HuF-denominated government securities are 
issued and redeemed by the Államadósság Kezelő Központ 
(Public Debt management Centre, hereinafter ‘ÁKK’) with 
the participation of the Központi elszámolóház és Értéktár 
Zrt. (Central Clearing House and Depository, hereinafter 
‘KeleR’) and the magyar Államkincstár (Hungarian State 
treasury, hereinafter ‘treasury’, as the owner of the single 
treasury account, or ‘KeSZ’1). the financial settlement of 
new  government  securities  are  usually  performed  on 
Wednesdays.  Redemption  is  performed  on  the  relevant 
maturity date, frequently also on Wednesdays.
For quite a long time, the treasury received the amount of the 
newly  issued  government  securities  from  its  buyers  (the 
so-called primary dealers, the custodians) in the real-time 
gross  settlement  system  operated  by  the  mnb  for  the 
settlement  of  large  value,  time-critical  payments.  Prior  to 
October 2009, however, the treasury performed its payment 
liabilities related to the redemption of government securities 
via the interbank Clearing System (iCS), used for the transfer 
of retail payments in large numbers and run mainly at night.
Levente Habány and Dr. Anikó Turján: 
Channelling government securities redemption 
into VIBER and its effects on payment systems 
and its participants*
Starting from October 2009, redemption of government securities was transferred to the real-time gross settlement system 
(VIBER) developed for the settlement of time-critical transfers and operated by MNB. This step ensures that the settlement 
of redemption is performed in the clearing system where the financial performance related to the issue of government 
securities has been carried out for a long time. Channelling redemption to VIBER has achieved its goal, as it allowed the issuer 
(the Hungarian state) to use the funds stemming from the issue for the purposes of repayments and manage its liquidity in a 
simpler and more flexible way. In addition, this change has not caused a significant liquidity shortfall for participants in either 
of the two payment systems. This resulted in clearly less liquidity demand in the financial settlement processes related to the 
issue of government securities and redemption upon expiry. Not even a slight disruption was caused by changeover in the 
payment systems: thanks to proper preparatory work, all the affected system participants changed to the new liquidity 
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Due to this procedural order and the time shift between the 
two systems (from the aspect of this given payment order 
the iCS’s operation precedes VibeR’s operation), within the 
settlement day the treasury had to transfer the amount for 
the  redemption  of  the  maturing  government  securities 
earlier than it could have access to the funds collected from 
newly issued securities which were meant to finance – partly 
or wholly – the maturity. this meant that the treasury had 
to keep the total gross amount of the maturity on KeSZ 
prior  to  maturities,  despite  the  fact  that  the  majority  of 
funds stemming from the sale of newly issued government 
securities was meant to finance redemption of the maturing 
government  securities.  this  situation  resulted  in  the  fact 
that due to the intraday liquidity requirement, on these days 
the treasury was required to keep a higher balance in KeSZ 
than otherwise required.
moTIVATIon FoR ImPRoVEmEnT In 
EFFICIEnCy
At the mnb’s initiative, the institutions involved (ÁKK, the 
treasury,  KeleR  and  mnb)  agreed  that  in  order  to 
improve efficiency, the above situation had to be changed. 
the objective they kept in view was to reduce the issuer’s 
intraday liquidity as well as its administrative burden. they 





















first.	 All	 the	 other	 accounts	 not	 included	 in	 gridlock	 resolution	 are	
credited	and	debited	in	the	normal	order.
Thus,	priority	has	significance	for	payment	settlements,	as	if	there	is	





used	 for	 ordinary	 (time-critical)	transfers	 which	 can	 be	 used	 by	 any	
VIBER	member.	In	the	case	of	identical	priorities,	the	principle	of	FIFO	is	




As	 VIBER	 does	 not	 allow	 partial	 settlement,	 the	 optimum	 order	 of	
payment	orders	is	essential.





ICS	 is	 a	 gross	 batch	 payment	 system	 operated	 by	 GIRO	 Zrt.	 for	the	
settlement	 of	 domestic	 retail	 payments.	 Operation	 on	 a	 gross	 basis	
means	that	no	credit	risk	is	generated	in	the	system	as	the	transactions	




performs	 the	 clearing	 of	 payment	 transactions,	 the	 MNB	 as	 the	
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government  securities  within  a  particular  settlement  day 
from  the  funds  stemming  from  the  issue  of  government 
securities. in the early phase of preparatory work, still in 
December  2008  and  january  2009,  ÁKK  conducted 
preliminary  consultation  with  the  custodians  on  the 
opportunity  to  introduce  an  early  submission  deadline 
during  the  day,  and  in  effect  they  did  not  object.  this 
opportunity  proved  feasible  and  was  integrated  into  the 
solution alternatives.
At the end of 2008 and in early 2009, the experts of ÁKK, 
the  treasury,  KeleR  and  the  mnb  analysed  three 
alternatives  for  the  settlement  of  flow  of  funds.  the 
common  features  of  the  possible  solutions  included  the 
requirement that redemption of the government securities 
should be channelled from iCS to VibeR and the fact that 
each of them was based on netting by KeleR’s participation. 
the fundamental difference was that netting was performed 
in narrower2 or wider ranges. Due to its simpler and more 
robust nature, from among the three possible solutions, the 
institutions involved selected the one that was based on the 
widest netting and utilisation of VibeR’s technical netting 
capacity.
the Appendix provides a report on a similar international 
initiative by the uS Fed, when they terminated free intraday 
credit for government-sponsored enterprises and gave them 
two years for adjustment to the changes.
TECHnICAL nETTInG SETTLEmEnT In 
VIBER
this type of settlement facilitates netting both in the case of 
custodians and the issuer by submitting payment orders via 
VibeR almost simultaneously, and it continues to be based 
on the DvP (delivery versus payment) procedure. the latter 
means that cash settlement of a transaction – in the payment 
and  securities  settlement  systems  (by  applying  the 
conditionally connected settlement method) – takes place 
parallel  with  the  settlement  on  the  securities  side.  (in 
practical terms, the way this is implemented in Hungary is 
that  KeleR  checks  whether  or  not  the  securities  are 
available on the seller’s account and if they are, it ‘seizes’ 
them. then KeleR initiates the cash transaction via VibeR 
and  once  the  cash  transaction  is  fulfilled  in  VibeR,  the 
securities side booking also becomes final.)
KeleR is involved in the settlement of government securities 
issuance  and  repayment  as  a  paying  agent.  Payment  is 
related to two phases. One of the phases is the financial 
settlement of newly issued government securities, when the 
cash  accounts  of  custodians  –  registered  in  the  so-called 
auction list – are debited and the issuer’s cash account is 
credited.  (the  auction  list  contains  whose  bids  and  the 
terms and conditions ÁKK accepted on the basis of auctions 
for government securities trading, announced for primary 
dealers  for  making  public  bids.)  the  other  phase  is  the 
settlement  of  matured  government  securities:  the  issuer’s 
cash account is debited and the custodians’ – according to 
the  so-called  payment  disposition  –  cash  accounts  are 
credited. (the payment disposition reveals to whom ÁKK 
must make the payment on maturity and of what amount.) 
both in case of maturity and new issues, cash settlement 
takes places in VibeR.
the  essence  of  the  change  is  that  based  on  the  payment 
disposition relevant to matured government securities, on 
the maturity date KeleR initiates the settlement of cash 
transactions arising from maturing items in a manner that 
debiting  the  issuer’s  account  and  crediting  the  credit 
institutional  custodians’  account  is  executed  on  their 
account kept in VibeR. the financial settlement of primary 
deals related to the issue of new government securities, is 
also implemented in VibeR on the same day. thus, it is 
sufficient if the issuer provides a volume of funds on its 
account  for  the  purpose  of  repayment,  by  which  his 
repayment  obligation  exceeds  the  liquidity  gained  from 
issuance. Otherwise, if the repayment obligation is less than 
the liquidity gained from issuance, the issuer does not need 
any additional funds, moreover, a liquidity surplus may be 
generated during the day or by the end of the day, the latest, 
which the issuer can use for any other purpose.
taking into account that KeleR initiates the settlement of 
payments  for  both  new  and  matured  securities  at  the 
beginning  of  the  relevant  settlement  day  by  the  latest  in 
VibeR  at  the  time  it  opens,  and  high  priority  –  which 
precedes all other payment orders, with the exception of 
central bank items – is separately assigned to these payment 
transactions (related to the government securities), therefore 
it can be taken as almost certain that all payment items are 
executed on the intended settlement day.
Payment orders that have sufficient cover in VibeR at the 
given  point  of  time,  will  be  settled  immediately  and 
irrevocably  in  VibeR,  while  the  rest  of  the  items  are 
queued (the above mentioned high-priority government 
security items that are perhaps queued, come right after 
the  central  bank  items,  before  all  other  items).  Any 
queued item will be processed when the VibeR member’s 
liquidity  increases  (receives  a  credit  item  from  another 
VibeR member or his or her credit line is increased) or 
2	The	narrower	solutions,	which	were	later	rejected,	were	directed	either	at	netting	on	the	Treasury’s	side	or	at	bilateral	netting	with	each	affected	custodian.mnb bulletin • june 2010 25
the  gridlock  resolution  algorithm  functions  well  in  the 
case of so-called gridlock. in practical terms, this means 
that if a high-priority item related to the purchase of new 
securities is first in the queue, practically no other debit 
can be made to the custodian’s account (in other words, 
the  transaction  of  payment  for  government  securities 
precedes  all  its  other  payment  items,  and  so  until  the 
former is settled, the given custodian’s outgoing payment 
transactions  are  halted).  thus  (if  required)  it  will  be 
motivated  to  provide  liquidity  as  soon  as  possible:  to 
increase either its current account balance or the same-
day credit line.
Gridlock  resolution  is  implemented  by  including  all  the 
accounts  that  are  affected  by  gridlock,  thus  if  gridlock 
applies to more than two VibeR accounts, then logically it 
is implemented multilaterally. this fact in general facilitates 
the settlement of payment transactions, and moreover the 
high  priority  of  the  affected  government  security  deals 
further reinforces this effect.
VibeR members can be notified (via SWiFt messages) about 
settlement, queuing and the size of queuing as well, whereas 
information on which member owes them is not visible to the 
other members. thus, during the day both the issuer and the 
custodian can see how and when their incoming and outgoing 
items are settled and on the basis of the queued item(s) each 
participant  can  make  arrangements  to  provide  the  funds 
necessary  for  gridlock  resolution  in  the  event  that  the 
gridlock resolution algorithm fails due to a general liquidity 
shortage. Any item still queued at the end of the day will be 
cancelled, thus the issuer needs to accumulate other resources 
for financing the missing funds concerning repayment.
the model is demonstrated – based on a specific example 
selected for illustration purposes – in box 2.























C	 or	 D	 custodian	 duly	 buys	 government	 securities	 held	 for	them,	 a	
1,000-unit	fund	is	received	by	the	issuer	therefore	the	issuer	does	not	











Box 2: Illustration of the selected solution
Chart 1
Payment flow t in case of technical netting 
settlement in VIBER
KESZ
Account of Custodian B
Account of Custodian C
Account of Custodian D














Custodian AmAGyAR nemZeti bAnK
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the technical netting implemented in VibeR did and does 
facilitate that items initiated to debit KeSZ are not financed 
by the KeSZ balance (made available on the previous day), 
but by the funds stemming from the sale of new government 
securities.  in  order  to  provide  the  ability  that  this  takes 
place in a timely manner in every case, it was necessary to 
ensure  that  KeleR  initiates  the  payment  order  at  the 
beginning of the day with a very high priority. namely, this 
results in treasury-ÁKK receiving the purchase price by all 
means at the beginning of the day, on the condition that the 
respective custodians are solvent. the high priority assigned 
to government securities guarantee that the system properly 
works  because  it  forces  the  custodians  to  provide  the 
liquidity  for  the  purchase  of  government  securities, 
otherwise their payment transactions would practically stop 
– with the exception of mnb items – and no single debit 
item could be posted on their current account, as long as 
they do not pay for the government securities.
What  facilitated  to  assign  a  high  priority  to  government 
securities  was  that  the  mnb  gave  such  a  high  priority 
(priority  ‘six’)  to  KeleR,  starting  from  October,  2009, 
which  it  formerly  reserved  exclusively  for  itself  for  the 
central bank related payment orders, but it essentially did 
not use this priority. Assigning priority six did not represent 
any threat from the mnb’s perspective, given that the mnb 
continues  to  have  the  exclusive  right  to  apply  priorities 
ranging from zero to five. the gridlock resolution algorithm 
was  triggered  automatically  every  30  minutes  before  the 
new system was launched, however, the option was already 
available  as  the  mnb’s  responsible  person  manually 
activated it even at the request of any VibeR member. At the 
time the proposal was elaborated, we also presumed that the 
timely settlement of government securities will be possible 
to guarantee in most cases – as a joint impact of its high 
priority  and  submitting  it  at  the  start  of  the  day  –  even 
without  deploying  the  gridlock  resolution  algorithm.  in 
order to further enhance the efficiency of the solution, the 
mnb also introduced the practice to launch the gridlock 
resolution algorithm more frequently, at intervals of every 
10 minutes, instead of the earlier 30-minute intervals.
For  the  implementation  of  the  solution,  some  minor 
development was necessary only at KeleR, which was carried 
out  by  September,  2009.  in  addition  to  the  development, 
testing was also carried out. On the basis of the test results, the 
mnb concluded that no threat is represented by the increased 
use frequency of the automated gridlock resolution algorithm 
for VibeR’s operational stability, and on the other hand ÁKK, 
KeleR  and  the  mnb  unanimously  agreed  that  the  new 
system of repayments can be launched. ÁKK and the mnb 
equally called the custodians’ attention to the changes in the 
settlement system of government securities, with the  mnb 
particularly  emphasising  that  due  to  these  changes,  the 
liquidity arising from government securities maturity will not 
be provided to them in iCS. thus, during the overnight iCS 
settlement the liquidity cannot be taken into account as cover 
for their outgoing iCS items. (naturally, in order to ensure 
application  of  the  new  settlement  system,  the  contractual 
conditions had to be modified4/established5 as well.)
AnALySInG THE ImPACTS oF 
CHAnGEoVER on THE CLEARInG 
SySTEm PARTICIPAnTS
Oversight of the payment, securities settlement and clearing 
systems is the central bank’s basic responsibility according 
to Section 4 (5) of the Act on the mnb. the explanation in 
the Act defines oversight activity as a systemic risk-oriented 
supervision of the operation of clearing systems, participating 
institutions,  infrastructures  connecting  these  systems  and 
the processes applied in payments and the payment methods. 
Accordingly, the mnb reviewed the impact of the decision 
on channelling government securities maturities from iCS 
to VibeR in its capacity as overseer.
under the old regime, each credit institution provided KeleR 
with the account number to which they requested the redemption 
of government securities at maturity. if the account was the 
credit  institution’s  current  account,6  kept  at  the  mnb,  then 
during the overnight settlement in iCS, the amount of repayment 
was received by mnb, which was then credited to the respective 
credit  institution  by  mnb  within  its  proprietary  account 
keeping  system.  thus  channelling  government  securities  to 
VibeR did not represent any change for these partners (roughly 
30 credit institutions) given that they did not use the government 
securities maturities as coverage for the overnight processing 
under the previous regime either.
there were, however, 12 credit institutions which requested 
the  government  securities  maturity  to  their  technical 
account managed under their own bank code, rather than 
their current account held at the mnb. this meant that 
they could use the funds received during the iCS overnight 
settlement to cover their outgoing items. Among these 12 
credit institutions, there were some significant ones: retail 





6	In	other	words,	account	numbers	beginning	with	190	(190	is	the	MNB’s	bank	code).mnb bulletin • june 2010 27
liquidity falling out from iCS had an impact on 12 credit 
institutions,  but  unequally.  Out  of  the  twelve,  the  new 
arrangement had the most adverse impact on the participants 
of the safe custody market since in addition to the securities 
in  their  ownership  they  also  used  the  amount  of  their 
customers’  securities  during  the  night  settlement.  in  the 
case  of  the  hardest  hit  group,  our  analysis  suggested 
altogether 11% less liquidity on average (see Chart 2) in the 
liquidity  available  in  iCS  after  clearing.  A  decrease  in 
liquidity  of  this  extent  cannot  be  considered  dangerous 
because these participants had already increased their credit 
line  –  which  represents  a  major  part  of  their  limit 
generated for the purposes of the iCS settlement – to its 
multiple since October 20087, in order to offset the effects 
of the crisis. Our model based on past figures could only 
detect  a  case  in  which  the  participants’  credit  line  was 
insufficient  for  financing  outgoing  payments  when  the 
maturity of government securities coincided with a deadline 
for  the  payment  of  some  kind  of  public  duties  (taxes). 
Funding would not be insufficient even in such cases as due 
to  the  mandatory  reserve  requirement  large  credit 
institutions keep substantial current account balance at the 
mnb, as compared to their iCS turnover. For this reason 
these  credit  institutions  could  easily  replace  the  liquidity 
falling out from iCS through the usual funding methods. 
Our  posterior  analysis  revealed  more  favourable  findings 
than what was expected about the liquidity remaining after 
clearing both in case of the more and the less affected system 
members. this is explained by the fact that iCS participants 
had  increased  their  credit  lines  by  36%  between  the 
compared two periods of time, which offset the effects of the 
minimum reserve ratio’s decrease8 and increased the limit 
available for clearing. usage of credit lines indicated that the 
credit  line  increase  was  performed  for  more  preventive 
reasons rather than to meet actual financing requirements.
CHAnnellinG GOVeRnment SeCuRitieS ReDemPtiOn intO VibeR AnD itS...
The notion of available liquidity remaining after clearing





amount	 of	 government	 securities	 due	 on	 the	 given	 day.	 Then	 we	
compared	 the	 resulting	‘modified	 liquidity	 remaining	 after	 clearing’	 	

















find	 out	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 impact	 of	 channelling	 the	 government	














Box 3: methodology of the prior and posterior impact analysis 
7	See	MNB:	Report on financial stability,	April	2009,	Chapter	2.3.1;	and	MNB:	Report on financial stability,	April	2010,	Chapter	2.8.	
8	The	MNB	decreased	the	reserve	ratio	from	5%	to	2%	effective	from	1	December	2008.mAGyAR nemZeti bAnK
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As a result of the preliminary impact analysis we pointed 
out that credit institutions with extensive corporate clientele 
need  to  calculate  their  liquidity  in  iCS  with  increased 
prudence  in  order  to  avoid  queuing  when  tax  payment 
deadlines coincide with the maturity date of government 
securities,  since  on  these  days  their  outgoing  payment 
turnover is already several times higher and the financing 
effect of government securities no longer offsets this volume 
in iCS.
CHAnGE In THE LIQuIDITy PoSITIon oF 
THE SySTEmS
ICS
As mentioned in box 1 above, part of the netting effect was 
lost with channelling into VibeR, as government security 
maturities – generally of large amount – are now excluded 
from the incoming items. For the 12 affected participants, 
migration to VibeR of their credits stemming from maturing 
government  securities,  previously  available  for  clearing, 
reduced the potential netting effect by 23% altogether, in 
the period chosen for posterior analysis, in comparison to 
their aggregate remaining liquidity available after clearing. 
Accordingly, the net financing requirement of the clearing 
has  increased.  if,  hypothetically,  the  liquidity  generated 
from government security maturities was returned to iCS, 
the  net  liquidity  requirement  calculated  for  the  most 
significant participants on the maturity days of government 
securities  would  fall  from  10.8%  to  6.4%  on  average 
according  to  the  data  observed  after  7  October  2009. 
nevertheless,  pressure  on  raising  additional  funds  was 
insignificant,  given  that  the  current  average  10.8%  net 
liquidity  requirement  still  indicates  very  ample  liquidity 
availability.
total iCS debit turnover has decreased overall. Regarding 
the 44 government security maturity days selected for the 
prior and posterior analysis, the average of total daily debits 
in iCS decreased by 21.1% between the periods preceding 
and following the 7 October 2009 change. 17.6 percentage 
points of this was due to channelling government security 
maturities into VibeR, and further 3.5% to other factors, 
mainly such as the decrease in the average item volume, in 
parallel with the decrease seen in the real economy, i.e. GDP 
decline, and the stagnation of turnover in terms of number 
as well as value of payments.
However, liquidity in the iCS system as a whole was only 
slightly affected by the change in the channel of government 
securities clearing. At the system level, the actual loss of 
liquidity  was  merely  2.6%  in  average  of  the  government 
security maturity days falling within the analysed period, 
for  all  participants  of  the  system.  this  underpins  our 
preliminary  estimate,  as  we  calculated  a  3%  potential 
liquidity  loss  for  the  entire  system  and  5-7%  for  the 
individual clearing members (see Chart 2). 
VIBER
in  VibeR  liquidity  practically  remained  unchanged  after 
the channelling of government securities.  the reason for 
this is that previously, the incoming funds from government 
security maturities had also been credited to VibeR from 
the participants’ current accounts held at the mnb at the 
opening of VibeR,9 as the liquidity received in iCS was the 
first item added to VibeR’s liquidity on any particular day 
through the posting of the interbank position matrix. thus 
from VibeR’s perspective, the only change caused by the 
channelling  of  government  securities  was  the  submission 
time schedule of payment orders by participants.
the change in timing is best observed in the treasury’s case. 
Owing to the new procedure, the ratio of cleared securities 
transactions has perceptibly increased in the first hour of 
VibeR’s operation up to 09:00 hours. Prior to the change, 
the  treasury’s  total  outgoing  securities-related  VibeR 
turnover, cleared before 09:00 hours, accounted for 30% in 
both number and value of payments, as a percentage of the 
intraday DvP orders. Following changeover this ratio rose 
above  75%.  Chart  3  clearly  illustrates  that  due  to  the 
adopted  procedure,  the  timing  of  treasury  items  on  the 
Chart 2
Effects of the decision on channelling government 
securities to VIBER according to pre- and posterior 
impact analyses of the affected participants












According to the prior
impact analysis










Change in liquidity of the less affected system participants
Change in liquidity of the more deeply affected 
system participants
Average aggregated credit line of the affected system 
participants (right-hand scale)
% HUF billion
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maturity  and  issue  dates  of  government  securities  now 
follows a definite pattern, where clearing of the redemptions 
in the beginning of the day around VibeR opening time 
prevails.
As  for  system  members,  it  could  be  observed  that  while 
there  is  an  increase  in  the  number  of  securities-related 
transfers to the treasury during the morning hours, their 
value has decreased, and this decrease has shifted to the 
period  between  09:00  to  12:00  hours.  in  practice,  this 
means that VibeR members slightly delay the execution of 
their high-value securities-related transfers in order to make 
use of the financing effect of payments received from the 
treasury up to 09:00, eventually for fear of queuing in the 
morning because of the execution of a major value transfer.
in order to prevent similar concerns, simultaneously with 
channelling security maturities to VibeR, the mnb reduced 
the  intervals  at  which  automatic  gridlock  resolution  is 
launched. this step was applied with a view to allaying such 
fears. its practical use would be manifest if the redemptions 
of and subscriptions to government securities were queuing 
among the same system participants vis-à-vis one another 
because of funds shortage. Obviously, gridlock resolution 
could be efficient in a situation where turnover is higher or 
liquidity is tighter than currently (similarly to the period 
around October 2008). However, in the period observed 
after  7  October  2009  not  a  single  item  was  executed  by 
gridlock resolution – it always used to be infrequent – which 
means that no such situation occurred. the reason for this 
lies primarily in the fact that the VibeR participants can use 
their credit lines, increased to its multiple as a result of the 
crisis. All of this supports VibeR’s ample liquidity supply.
PRIoR AnD PoSTERIoR AnALySIS oF 
DEVELoPmEnTS In KESZ BALAnCES
One of the arguments justifying change in the settlement of 
securities transactions was to achieve potential reduction in 
the KeSZ balance. 
Our  posterior  analysis  covered  23  government  securities 
maturity days falling in the period between 7 October 2009 
and 10 march 2010, each also being an issue date. in this 
period, HuF 67 billion could be saved on average on the 
KeSZ  balance.  On  each  analysed  day,  both  issues  and 
redemptions were due. On five days redemptions exceeded 
the value of issued government securities. On these days 
savings in the KeSZ balance was considered equal to the 
amount collected from issues, as this is the amount by which 
the  KeSZ  balance  did  not  have  to  be  increased  to  fulfil 
redemptions.  in  those  more  frequent  cases  when  issue 
exceeded the value of redemptions, the saving on the KeSZ 
balance materialises in that there is no need to pre-fund the 
redemptions one day before the value date, as it could fully 
financed from the inflow collected from the issue.
ConCLuSIonS
in October 2009, the arrangement for financial execution of 
the redemption of maturing government securities to the 
primary dealers (custodians) changed. Since then, KeleR 
as paying agent acting on behalf of ÁKK, initiates redemption 
Chart 3
The Treasury’s time schedule pattern in VIBER on 
the maturity days of government securities 
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Chart 4
Decrease in the KESZ balance achievable by the 
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in VibeR in the morning on the due date. thus, execution 
of the redemption has been relocated to the payment system 
(VibeR) which has been accommodating the execution of 
the issue of new government securities for a long time.
in addition to custodians, changeover now allows the issuer 
(the Hungarian State) to use the funds received from the 
other party (parties) as funding for the outgoing settlements. 
As a result, liquidity management has become simpler and 
more flexible for the issuer and ÁKK, and the redemption of 
maturing  government  security  (all  other  conditions 
remaining  unchanged)  can  be  transacted  with  far  lower 
current  account  balances,  and  thus  liquidity  savings  are 
realised. the change in the clearing channel also created 
identical conditions for all parties involved, as ÁKK and the 
custodians execute their outgoing payments simultaneously 
with the help of technical netting available in VibeR.
Changeover was performed smoothly both in VibeR and in 
iCS,  the  system  previously  used  for  the  redemption  of 
maturing government securities. Prior to the change, the 
mnb did not forecast significant changes in the level of 
liquidity risk involved in the systems. thorough preparation 
of the affected parties and the preventive measures taken 
(re-shaping the priority scale, introduction of more frequent 
gridlock resolution, attention drawn to the possible impacts 
on liquidity of the change of regime), meant that liquidity 
risks have not materialised in any of the payment systems; 
the  treasury,  however,  could  theoretically  execute 
government security redemption with lower liquidity than 
prior to the change, while the other participants’ liquidity 
remained approximately at the same level.
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AnnEX: A SImILAR InTERnATIonAL 
InITIATIVE
Although  for  different  motives,  similar  initiatives  can  be 
seen  in  the  international  practice  (mcAndrews,  2006). 
Pursuant  to  its  2004  decision,  the  Fed  terminated  free 
intraday lending for government-sponsored enterprises (e.g. 
Fannie mae, Freddie mac, hereinafter ‘GSe’) and provided 
them two years for adjustment to the change. According to 
a preliminary impact analysis undertaken by the Fed, the 
measure  led  to  delays  in  the  performance  of  payments 
started  by  GSes,  but  sufficient  time  was  allowed  for  the 
proactive  mitigation  and  elimination  of  this  effect.  the 
basic situation was similar to the one found in Hungary: 
settlement related to government securities as performed in 
two systems, as incoming and outgoing payments were not 
aligned in the case of GSes on financing terms (despite the 
fact that they were actually transacted in the same system), 
while  prior  to  2004  this  was  solved  by  intraday  credit 
granted by the Fed.
the article referenced here lists several options for offsetting 
the effects of intraday credit termination, one of them being 
pre-funding,  which  practically  corresponds  to  the  initial 
state  of  affairs  in  Hungary,  as  it  requires  additional 
accumulation of funds and bearing all of its costs (GSes 
have non-interest bearing accounts kept at the Fed). A far 
more  efficient  solution  is  offered  in  the  modification  of 
market conventions related to payment timing. in the uSA, 
this requires primarily the match the inflow and outflow of 
GSes’ payments between days and within one day. effects 
on the participants affected by payments may be mitigated 
if pursuant to multilateral agreements GSe’s measures are 
supported  by  advanced  queuing  and  liquidity-savings 
procedures in the payment systems performing clearing and 
settlement. in Hungary, this direction was followed under 
the control of ÁKK, the treasury, KeleR and the mnb.
in the uSA, partly due to the central bank’s intraday lending 
policy  features,  in  the  case  of  GSe’s  the  issue  of 
accommodating the intraday funding needs from alternative 
sources  also  arose  (outside  the  central  bank  –  using 
correspondent  banking,  bilateral  funding  arrangement 
relying  on  lines  of  credit,  implicit  or  explicit  intraday 
market for funds), while in Hungary the solution described 
in this paper was considered more efficient and faster than 
the above uS methods.